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QUERIOUS 2 PATCH CODE

Run the query for a first time, and for a limited time period (7 days as in our example) or limited set of hosts.

Ultimately, you can leverage the following process:

Perform a separate investigation on the user or their device to determine if there’s any other events that may be out of the ordinary.

If possible, grab a copy of the file and use the option to submit to Microsoft (or a private sandbox of your choice if public sandbox, then know that what you upload is public to everyone) to further determine if it is malicious.

Verify with the user if they have knowledge of opening this file, and if it was from an email they were expecting.

Pay special attention to files opened locally or launched by Outlook as parent process: chances are likely this is the result from a phishing email. If it does not contain a remote web address, the file is stored and opened locally. If it contains a remote web address, the file was likely opened from SharePoint or from another online location.

While each of these processes warrant a closer look, you’ll be able to assess quicker if there’s anything anomalous going on by verifying what’s in the InitiatingProcessCommandLine column.

Runtimebroker.exe: helps manage permissions from Microsoft Store apps (such as Microsoft Office).

Protocolhandler.exe: handles URI schemes in Microsoft Office.

Explorer.exe: graphical user interface, the result of a user opening, for example, Microsoft Word from their Documents folder.

None of these processes are anomalous per se: These results can be broken down as follows:

This was of course tested – a sample set of over 10,000 endpoints across several environments and spanning 7 days, delivered a total of 37 results. Get a string length larger than 40 characters: this is to weed out false positives, for example where the command line only contains the process in question and a parameter such as /restore or /safe.Add relevant Microsoft Office process names to an array.In this query, the following is performed: InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCreationTime,

| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, | where strlen(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) > 40 We only want actual files ran, not Office restore operations etc. | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (process) Seeing there is reported exploitation in the wild (ITW), we decided to write a quick Kusto (KQL) rule that allows for hunting in Microsoft Defender ATP. The vulnerability as such resides in this MSHTML component. In practice, the attack basically involves a specially-crafted Microsoft Office document, which includes an ActiveX element, which activates the MSHTML component. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights. The attacker would then have to convince the user to open the malicious document. Microsoft is aware of targeted attacks that attempt to exploit this vulnerability by using specially-crafted Microsoft Office documents.Īn attacker could craft a malicious ActiveX control to be used by a Microsoft Office document that hosts the browser rendering engine.

QUERIOUS 2 PATCH CODE

Microsoft is investigating reports of a remote code execution vulnerability in MSHTML that affects Microsoft Windows. On September 7th 2021, Microsoft published customer guidance concerning CVE-2021-40444, an MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability: